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The link between  the political  system  of a country  and its economic  growth  has
attracted  a great deal  of attention  in recent  years.' Empirical  studies.have  yielded  mixed  results.
Authors  from Friedman  (1962)  to Scully  (1988)  have  argued  that politically  open societies  grow
at much  faster rates than do societies  where freedoms  are restricted. On the other hand, others
such  as Kormendi  and Meguire  (1985)  have found a negative  relationship  between civil  liberties
and growth;  one reason for this, summarized  by Barro (1994), is that more  political  freedom  may
also entail  a greater role for interest  groups  in the legislative  process,  which  may  in turn act to
retard growth. 2 The general  finding  from this literature  is best summarized  by Landeli-Mills  and
Serageldin  (1991):  benevolent  dictators  are rare but democracies  often  resort to populist  policies
that are inimical  to growth.
This paper has a narrower  focus:  it only considers  labor market  policies.  What,  if
any, is the link between  such  policies  and political  regimes? Many  governments  in developing
countries  have  adopted labor  policies-including high  minimum  wages, public  sector
overemployment  and tough  job security  regulations-which may  benefit  a small  group of
"insiders"  who  already  have  modem-sector  jobs. But these same  policies hurt "outsiders"  by
limiting  their opportunities  for better employment,  and thus have a negative  impact  on income
distribution.  In addition,  these  labor  market distortions  can lead  to efficiency  losses and may
discourage  investment  and growth. Governments  usually  adopt  those policies  for political  rather
than economic  motives. Hence,  the question  we address  here is whether  the probability  of
1 For an extensive  survey  of the literature  see Alesina  and Perotti (1994).
2  In a theoretical  paper Azam (1994)  takes  a different  approach. He argues  that if democracy  provides  positive
utility,  then at the margin one would  expect  it to  be negatively  correlated  with output.2
government  intervening  in the labor  market to benefit  "insiders"  is at all  related  to the nature of
the regime. Are authoritarian  regimes  or democratic  ones more likely  to succumb  to interest
group pressure  and use labor  policies  to give  these groups  (especially  organized  labor) special
privileges?
In this paper, we use data for ninety  developing  countries  in an attempt to draw
general  lessons,  and to link  the probability  of governments  adopting  different  policies  to the
nature  of the political  regime. The paper  is divided  into six sections. After  this introduction,
section  2 presents  a general  discussion  of the possible  links  between political  structure  and labor
policies. A more rigorous  exposition  of the underlying  analytical  model  is presented  in section  3.
Section  4 derives  estimating  equations  and describes  the data used, and section  5 presents  the
results  of the empirical  tests. Section  6 summarizes  our conclusions.
2.  Political systems and labor  policies
The existing  literature  linking  economic  growth  to political  regimes  mostly  avoids
an exact  definition  of "democratic"  and  "authoritarian".  This is understandable,  considering  that
the two terms are inexact  at best when applied  to the range of political  systems  existing  in the
world today. While  realizing  that authoritarianism  and democracy  exist  in a continuum  (a fact
that we explicitly  build  into our empirical  work), our understanding  of the terms is, perhaps,
closest  to the way they  have  been used  by Przeworsky  (1991). He notes that: " ... authoritarian
regimes  abhor independent organizations;  they either  incorporate  them  under centralized  control
or repress  them by force" (p. 55, emphasis  added).  Less authoritarian  (and thus more
3  Przcworsky's  definition  of  democracy  is pithier:  "Democracy  is a system  in which  parties  lose  elections."
(Przeworsky  1991,  p. 10). He  does  go on  to discuss  how  the  key  feature  of democracies  is that they  are  populated
by  collective  organizations  (p. 12).3
democratic)  societies  allow  freer  participation  by independent  organizations  into the political
process. 4
With  this as background,  one could develop  two sharply  contrasting  viewpoints
about  the whether  efficient  labor market  policies-defined as market-determined  wages  and
employment  levels-are  more  or less  likely  to occur  under more authoritarian  regimes. Apparent
support  for both views  can be provided  by country  examples.
One  view is that authoritarianism,  and the associated  labor  repression,  is
sometimes  needed  to offset  rent-seeking  behavior  by potentially  powerful  trade unions.  According
to this notion,  freer societies  are susceptible  to inflated  "insider"  wages, strikes  and other forms  of
industrial  unrest, and lower investment  and employment  creation. This is because  high levels  of
civil  liberties  permit  trade unions  to agitate  for above-market  rents; moreover,  with contestable
political  systems,  these rents are likely  to be granted  to the unions,  to nullify  their political
opposition. Hence,  this viewpoint  concludes  that authoritarian  societies,  better able  to discourage
rent-seeking  activities  by free unions,  are more compatible  with labor market  efficiency.
This view can be supported  by examples  from Chile,  Korea, Singapore,  and
Turkey  in the 1970s  and early 1980s. At various  times during  these two decades,  authoritarian
regimes  in these countries  repressed  trade unions  and denied  basic  rights  to workers. Yet, during
the years  of repression,  Korea, Singapore,  and Turkey  experienced  spectacular  growth in the
manufacturing  sector and an increasing  demand  for labor. Rising  profitability  and labor  demand  in
4  At  one  extreme,  the only  organizations  allowed  free  association  may  be relatively  harmless  ones: Przeworsky
(1991,  p. 54n)  gives  the  examples  of stamp  collectors'  societies  and  producer's  associations.  But  a free  press,  free
trade  unions  and truly  contesting  political  parties  are  permitted  by only  the  most  democratic  regimes.4
manufacturing  increased  the welfare  of workers  as a whole. Although  similar  results  were not
immediately  apparent  during  Chile's  authoritarian  phase,  it is believed  that the labor reforms
undertaken  during  authoritarian  rule laid  the foundation  for the strong  resurgence  of the Chilean
economy  in the 1990s.
Examples  of democracies  which  adopted  poor labor  market policies  can be used to
lend  further  credence  to this argument.  In India,  long considered  one of the few stable
democracies  in the developing  world, labor  market  distortions  have  been common.  Consider  the
example  of coal miners,  who are highly  unionized,  and mostly  concentrated  in Bihar,  one of
India's  most populous  and politically  important  states. A measure  of their political  power is
demonstrated  by the fact that during  the period 1972-85,  they  enjoyed  large  jumps in their real
wages  just in the years  before  national  elections  (Banerji  and Sabot 1994). Inefficient  labor laws
were also prevalent  in democratic  Peru during  the 1980s. For instance,  workers enjoyed  an
extreme  form of income  security,  with labor stability  guaranteed  by the constitution-no workers
could be dismissed  or even  made to retire. This  law was enacted  because,  in order  to hold onto
power given  Peru's volatile  politics,  the various democratic  rulers  required  the support  of urban
labor  unions. Over the years, democracies  as diverse  as Trinidad  and Tobago, Sri Lanka  and
Senegal  have  given large economic  rents  to their unionized  employees.
The contrasting  view is that the probability  of governments  passing  inefficient
labor  legislation  to benefit  "insiders"  is actually  higher  under authoritarian  regimes. Authoritarian
regimes  are often subordinate  to the special  interests  that let them hold on to power (Ames 1987).
Lacking  the broader  base of more democratic  governments,  such  regimes  may  use labor  policies
to acquire support  from powerful  groups  such as the urban  labor elite. An important  difference5
between  democratic  and authoritarian  regimes  is the degree  of outsider  influence. In a well-
functioning  democracy  outsiders  vote and impose  some  limits  on what narrower  interest  groups
can achieve. But in a dictatorship  the government  need only  worry about those groups  who have
real power. Since  power  is less evenly  distributed  than  votes, insider  groups have  a greater say in
dictatorships.
Support  for this view comes  from the fact that labor  market distortions  persist in
many  non-democratic  countries.  Sub-Saharan  Africa  provides  many  examples. Overstaffing  in
the public  sector, high minimum  wages,  and restrictions  on firing-policies introduced  in Congo,
Kenya,  Sudan,  Tanzania,  and Zambia  in the 1960s-reflected political  realities. Authoritarian
post-independence  governments  in these countries  needed  to appease  urban  populations  to avoid
political  unrest. Labor market  policies  established  a system  that placated  urban interests  at the
expense  of millions  of poor, informal,  and rural  workers. The phenomenon  of authoritarian
regimes  succumbing  to interest  group pressure  is not limited  to Sub-Saharan  Africa. In Egypt in
the 1950s  and 1960s,  President  Nasser  needed  the support of the urban  middle  class,  and
guaranteed  their children  a public  sector  job upon college  graduation. In Bangladesh  in the
1980s,  General  Ershad needed  the support,  or at least non-opposition,  of the labor  elite
represented  by SKOP,  an organization  of trade unions. He negotiated  with SKOP and agreed  to
increase  public  sector wages  and double  severance  pay, allowances,  and nonwage  benefits.
While  there are numerous  developed  countries  which  have relatively  efficient  labor
markets,  there are not many  good examples  of long-lived  democracies  with good labor  policies  in
the developing  world. But a few examples  do stand  out. Hong Kong, even though  it is a colony,
has long had a democratic  system  of local  government  and  free trade unions,  and has maintained6
very  flexible  and competitive  labor markets. Chile's  move  to democracy  and trade union  freedom
has not led to any  change  in labor  policies,  and labor regulations  in Chile  continue  to avoid
providing  rents for insiders. The end of repression  in Korea  in 1987  was initially  associated  with
very contentious  industrial  relations. However,  since  1990, collective  bargaining  has become  an
established  institutional  arrangement,  with no negative  impact  on the functioning  of the labor
market  and on wage competitiveness. 5
The paucity  of examples  of countries  with free political  systems  as well  as good
labor markets  may  merely  reflect  the fact that freedom  is a relatively  new phenomenon  in the
developing  world.  However,  with the increasing  number  of these countries  adopting  more
participatory  political  systems,  the question  of whether  such systems  will enhance  or worsen  the
operation  of their labor  markets  becomes  even  more pertinent.
3.  An analytical  framework
We design a simple analytical  model that helps illustrate the two competing
arguments.  A static two-sector political economy model similar to Grossman and Helpman
(1994) is developed.  In this model, agricultural workers are not covered by any labor legislation.
Urban workers, however, are unionized and attempt to influence  the government to enact
policies-such  as minimum  wages-favorable  to them. Manufacturing sector employers, who
own the fixed factor of production, also attempt to influence policies-such  as trade protection-
which raise their profits. We use the model to derive two estimating equations: one determining
5  Botswana  and  Mauritius  can  be considered  as two  other  examples  of free  polities  with  less  distorted  labor
market  policies.7
the level of protection  in the economy  and  the other  the concession  (or mark-up)  given  to the
unionized  workers.
We assume  that there are three groups  in the economy,  with the total population
normalized  to one:
O  < I < 1  unionized  urban  laborers
O  <  k < 1  capitalists
a  = (1 - I - k)  rural (agricultural) laborers
The economy  has two goods-a  non-manufactured  good x, and a manufactured
consumption  good c.
Production In both the agricultural  and urban  informal  sector, the good x is
produced  with labor only,  at a wage normalized  to one:
x = f(a) = a
The informal  sector uses  those urban  workers  who are unemployed.  Thus, urban
workers  have a "floor"  wage of one, which  can be considered  to be the supply  price of labor in
the economy. In the manufacturing  sector, quantity  Q of the good c is produced  with labor  L ￿  1,
and,  a fixed  amount  of capital  K owned  by the capitalists:
Q =  F(L, K)8
Profits accrue  to the employers,  or capitalists. Profit  maximization  by
manufacturing  firms  is on the basis  of the domestic  price  of the good, p (which  differs  from the
world pricep* by the amount  of the tariff) and the prevailing  manufacturing  wage rate, w (which
can be influenced  by the government  through  minimum  wage and other legislation).  Profit
maximization  yields:
Q =  Q(p  W)
and
)L  =  (wlp);  Lp =-(wlp)Lw;  Qp  = (w/p)Lp; Qw = (wlp)Lw  (1)
(subscripts  denote  partial  derivatives).
Tariffs. The government  sets  tariff  t  on imports  of the manufactured  good, by
setting the domestic price p = (p* + t).  Tariff revenues R are (as in Grossman and Helpman
1994)  redistributed  evenly  to every  individual  in the economy. Since  the population  is normalized
to one, each individual  receives  an amount  R.  Since  imports  of the good are given  by (c - Q),
and c = c(p) (see later),
R(p, w) = (p -p*)[c(p) - Q(p,  w)J = 4[c(p)  - Q(p,  w)J
Using  (1), we get:
Rp  = (c- Q) +  T[cp  - (w/p)Lp]
(2)
R.=  - Xc  (w/p)L,,9
Incomes.  The three groups  are superscripted  by A, L and K for agricultural
workers,  urban labor  and capitalists  respectively.  Employed  manufacturing  workers and the
capitalists  are forced to pay a "tax" v to the government  out of their incomes  (this  is explained  in
greater detail  below). Each member  of the unionized  labor  and the capitalists  also pay
contributions  (or bribes),  denoted  as bl a = L, K), to the government  in an attempt to influence
policy  (as in Grossman  and Helpman  1993  and Rama and Tabellini  1994). The contribution  from
each of the two groups  is a mapping  with the prevailing  policy  parameters-the wage and the
domestic  price (affected  by the tariff  set by the government).
Post-contribution  incomes  for each  individual  in the groups are: 6
.'  =1 +R  (3a)
k = (1 -v)f( + (1/1)  [(w-1)L]) + R - bL(p,w)  (3b)
y  = (1 -v)(l/k)(pQ  - wL) + R - bk(p,w)  (3c)
Individual utility and welfare implications of policy.  Each individual in the
economy  consumes  two goods-the  primary  good x and the manufactured  good c.  Individual
utility  maximization  for individual  i is given  by:
Max u'  = x'  +  v(cf)
s.t. y' = x'  +  pC,
This  gives  us c' =  c(p) for all consumers,  and the partial  derivatives:
Up =yp  - C;  u'W  =y'w  (4)
6  Equation  (3b)  is derived  from  the fact  that,  with  probability  LI, urban  workers  receive  wage  (1 -v)w,  while  with
probability  (1 -L), their  wage  is  just  (1  -v)  (as  in Rama  and  Tabellini  1994).10
The change in the pre-contribution welfare of individuals in each group with changes in policy
variables can then be calculated using (2) and (3).
For agricultural workers:
,,A4p=Rp  -c;  UAW  = RW  (5a)
For manufacturing labor:
uLp=  (0/I)(1-v)(w-l)Lp  + Rp  - c;  uL. =  Rw +(1/l)(1-v)[L + (w-I)Lw]  (5b)
For the capitalists:
brp = (I -v) (I  1)Q  + Rp - c;  urw  =-(I  - v)(lJ)L  + Rw  (5c)
Urban labor and capitalists each optimize their political contributions until the
marginal effect of the contribution on policy equals the marginal increase in their own welfare
from the same policy:
uLp =bL  ;  uLw=  b
(6)
uKp=  bK  ;  uw=  bKw-
The government.  The government sets the policy parameters. Its objective may
not be to merely act as a social planner which maximizes national welfare, but in addition, to
ensure that it remains in power.  This second purpose is motivated in our model by presuming that
if the government is in power, it can extract rent from the formal sector's  product-i.e.,  it can
charge the "tax" v, introduced earlier, on the incomes of employed labor and the capitalists. For
the time being, we assume that v  is a given for the economy, and measures a particular71
government's  "venality". 7 v = 0 indicates  a purely  altruistic  social planner,  and v = 1 indicates  a
totally  confiscatory  regime.
We also assume  that the probability  of the government  maintaining  its power is
affected  by non-policy  actions  which  the government  may  take-for  example,  election  campaigns
or maintaining  a military. These  actions  are financed  by the political  contributions  it receives  from
labor  and the capitalists  (which  can, of course,  be also thought of as proxies for the degree  of
support  these groups  provide  to the government).
The government  thus maximizes  its objective  function  F, where
F= W+ V  (7a)
where:
W=kuK(p,w) + I  uL(p,w) + a uA  (p,w)  (7b)
V = ,(B) v[pQ(p,w)]  (7c)
B  = sLbL  (,W)  +  bK  (p,w)  (7d)
Wirepresents  pure aggregate  welfare  of individuals  in the economy. V,  on the
other hand,  is a term that captures  the expected  rents to a non-altruistic  government  from staying
in power. As discussed,  the rents amount  to a tax v on the value of manufacturing  production.
Note that when v = 0 (the government  is non-venal),  V  = 0 and thus F= W-the  government
only maximizes  aggregate  welfare.
7  This  assumption  can  be relaxed  and  the  conditions  under  which  the  venality  may  be  partly  endogenous  can  be
easily  explored.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  however,  it is sufficient  to  treat  v  as exogenous.12
xrindicates  the probability  that the government  will stay in power  in order  to enjoy
the rents (in  this static  model,  it may  also be thought of as the number  of years  that the
government  believes  it will  be in power). This probability  is assumed  to increase  with larger
political  contributions  from urban groups,  i.e., ;r'(B) > 0, as the government  is assured  more
tangible  and intangible  political  support  from the interest  groups. However,  for a given
government,  the contributions  from the capitalists  and labor  may  not have  equal value:  their
relative  importance  in the particular  polity are measured  by the shares  I  and sK,  with 1 2 SL 2 0,
and sK = 1 - sL.'
The government  maximizes  rwith  respect  to its policy  parametersp and w
Using (1),  the first order conditions  are:
,rp  _  W  p  + Vp  WpB  + V[(  )Bp +(l-Iy)/p]  =  0  (8a)
r.  = W  +V  = W.  + V[(plB) B.  - (y/w)]  = 0  (8b)
where  p = Bxr'(B)/,r  measures  the elasticity  of the probability  of remaining  in power with respect
to political  contributions;  r = pQp/Q  is the price elasticity  of production  (i.e., the supply  elasticity)
of the manufactured  good.
Calculating  the values of W, Bp, WW  and  BV,  from (7b) and (7d), using
(1), (2) and (6) and simplifying  the simultaneous  equation  system  that results,  we get the
government's  optimal  tariff and manufacturing  wage  premium  in equilibrium: 9
S  Rama  and Tabellini  (1994)  use  such  a model  to explore  the  behavior  of  "leftist"  and  "right-wing"  govenments.
9  The simultaneous  equations  are:13
p[Q/c  [1(1va{sK  +(yhA)(SL  _SK)}  VQ{1+r(1+Q))]  (9)
-%_)  - ~~~~_  - + - + (I  ~~~(10)
(  W  )  SL  _  I(1V)  p  +(I  - )  +(/i(L_S)(0
where S'  (  Vp/B)!, J =  L, K (so that when v = 0, so is S').  We have also defined
[1  + kSK  + ILSL  =  a.(when v = 0, a  = 1). Finally, we have used two elasticity measures to
simplify  the equations. 1 = pc/c  is the price elasticity of consumption, and A = (wL,)/L is the
wage elasticity of labor demand in manufacturing.
Equations (9) and (10) demonstrate a common feature of this class of models.  As
(9) shows, the government makes its decision about the degree of openness in the economy
independent of the wage decision. Since Q and c are endogenous, the decision on the level of
protection is a function of variables relating to the structure of the economy (TI,  y and X), and
political variables summarized by V, ca and the S's.
This simple model also predicts that government only interested in maximizing
welfare, i.e., one which is "non-venal," will set tariffs at zero.10 However, if staying in power and
collecting rents are also in its objective function, it would impose tariffs and create a wedge
between domestic and foreign prices. The size of the tariff will depend upon government's
[1+ kSK  + ISl] (qc - 7Q) [i/p]  - [1 + kSK  + ISL] Q +  (I-v)[l  +SKjQ
+ (1-v)[1+SL]  ?Q [(w-1)/w] + V(1+ Vp  = o
[1+ kSK  + lS' IfQ[vp]+(1_v)[S_S/](wik/p)  - (_-v) [I +SL]  YQ  [(w-)/wJ  +  Vyp = 0
'°  Non-venality  implies  v = 0, and thus V  = 0. The last term in (9) drops out. Since the Ss are equal  to one, as is
cr, the second  term becomes  one, and  T/p  =  0.14
preferences, the power of interest groups and economic factors, such as the price elasticity of
imports, that determine the relationship between tariff changes and changes in revenue.
The wage distortion depends directly on the trade regime.  Specifically, if the
economy decides to adopt freer trade policies (i.e., Xr  is low), the optimal wage distortion will also
be smaller.  One intuitive way of thinking about this is to consider that the government first
decides on the total excess rents in the economy that is optimal for it, and then makes a decision
about the allocation of this rent among organized labor and the capitalists based on the relative
importance of the two groups.  As before, the manufacturing sector wage premium in equilibrium
is zero if the government is non-venal.
4.  Estimating equations and data
The above discussion highlights the key variables determining government
decisions to intervene in the goods and labor markets, and indicates the size of the intervention.
However, it does not tell us how those variables would change in response to the nature of the
regime.  For example, equations (9) and (10) imply that as the importance it attaches to organized
labor (St) increases, the government will impose more trade restrictions and raise the minimum
wage.  However, the model has nothing to say about whether St  is generally higher under
authoritarianism or under democracy. This is the empirical question that we now turn to.
We are interested in estimating equations for the level of trade protection (T/p)  and
the wage distortion:  (w-l)/w.  However, data on wages for a large number of developing
countries are difficult to obtain and, more seriously, may be of questionable quality.  Therefore,
"  If v = 0, the second  and third terms drop out, and, since r is zero,  so is the wage premium.15
we also consider a measure of labor market distortion other than wages: the proportion of
workers employed in the formal sector, L.  From the model, this is negatively related to the wage
distortion, with higher formal wages leading to a decline in output and employment in that sector,
pushing more workers into agriculture and other informal activities.  We feel that estimating an
additional equation with L rather than  (w-1)/w as the explanatory variable is one way of testing
the robustness of our conclusions.
Equation (9) can be written in a more general form as follows:1 2
't= f Q  c;  7, r, )P  *;  1, k, S,K,  v, 7)  (I1
This is a structural equation presenting the average tariff rate as a function of two variables that
are endogenous to the model (output of the industrial good and consumption-Q  and c), four
exogenous economic variables (the price elasticities of consumption and production and the wage
elasticity of the demand for labor, as well as the international price of the industrial good-al,  y, x
and p*), and six exogenous political variables (the tax rate, the relative importance of urban labor
and the capitalists and the weights the government attaches to them, as well as the number of
years the government expects to remain in power-v,  1,  k, S,  SK and i).  The reduced form
equation will be:
t  = f(,n,  y, X,  p  *,  v, 1,  k, SL,  S',  )  (12)
Similarly,  equation (10) can be written in general form as:
(w-l)/w  =  g (T,  v;  p*,  X;  I,k,  L,KSK,  t)  (13)
12  Note that we made use of the fact that  p=p  *(1  + 1).16
and the reduced form is:
(w-l)Av= gi (n, y, X, p*, v, 1,  k, !S!,  SK,  7C)  (14)
Since X is predetermined with respect to the wage distortion, equation (13) can be estimated using
ordinary least squares.
We estimate equations (12)-(14) using cross sectional data for 90 developing
countries. 13 For a measure of  trade distortion, T, we started by using the work of Dollar (1992)
who estimates a measure of an economy's openness to trade for a large number of counties.  This
index-which  we shall refer to from here on as DOLLAR-rises  as the level of protection
increases.  Since this index is available only for 1990, our analysis using DOLLAR is limited to
cross sectional work for that year.
However, DOLLAR,  like most other measures of openness, does have some
shortcomings. Pritchett (1991) shows that alternative objective measures of openness produce
very different country rankings, and argues that the probability of deriving a single straightforward
measure that produces a "correct" ranking of countries is very low.  14  Obviously, we do not
attempt to find such a measure, but we experiment with using alternatives to DOLLAR to check the
robustness of our conclusions. Three alternatives were used:  the mean frequency of non-tariff
barriers on manufacturing goods (MNTB),  the mean of total import charges on manufacturing
goods (TARIFF), and the black market premium (BMP).
13  Since  some  data  is missing  for some  countries  the actual number  of observations  varies  from  one regression  to
the  other  depending  on  the  availability  of the  variables  included  in the regression.
14  For  further  analysis  of this  question  see Leamer  (1988) or  Harrisson  (1991).17
Table 1 shows the correlation coefficient between the different openness measures.
They are not highly correlated, with correlation coefficients ranging from a high of 0.37 for MNTB
and BMP to a low of -0.21 for the DOLLAR index and TARIFF.  The difficulty  of choosing a measure
of openness is demonstrated by Figure 1, which shows the average of each measure for seven
groups of low and middle-income countries.  According to the DOLLAR index, trade distortions
were highest in West Africa, followed by East Africa, and were lowest in South and East Asia.
As the figure shows, regional rankings change dramatically when other measures are used.
Table 1 Correlation coefficients  between  different openness  measures
DOLLAR  NTB  TARIFF  BMP
DOLLAR  1.00
NTB  0.08  1.00
TARIFT  -0.21  0.23  1.00
BMP  0.21  0.37  0.08  1.00
Figure 1 Measures of openess  (1990)
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Source:  Dollar  (1992)  and Prichett (1991).18
We rely on DOLLAR  as our primary  measure  and use the others  for "sensitivity"
analysis,  because  it provided  us with the largest  number  of consistent  cross  country observations
for a fairly  recent  year, 1990. We could  not use some  of the other appealing  measures  of
openness-like the one developed  by Learner  (1988)-for  sensitivity  analysis,  because of the
small  number  of observations  for low- and middle-income  countries.
Measuring  labor  market  distortions  and the degree  of protection  to "insiders"  is
also a difficult  empirical  task. Ideally,  we would  have  liked  to use the ratio of formal  to informal
or rural  wages,  adjusting  it for different  worker characteristics.  Once  again,  however,  the data is
unavailable  for a large number  of countries. Hence,  we used as the numerator  the average  wage
of an unskilled  worker in manufacturing  (which  we obtained  from the ILO data base),  assuming
that unskilled  workers  will  have characteristics  that resemble  those of informal  workers. Finding
a suitable  denominator  was even  more problematic,  because  the informal  sector wage rates are
unavailable  for many  countries. Instead,  we had to use non-manufacturing  GDP per worker as
proxy  for the informal  wage  rate. Thus, our wage distortion  index  (IDx)  is simply  the ratio of the
manufacturing  wage rate to the non-manufacturing  value added  per worker. An increase  of this
index  is taken to imply  greater distortions  and more privileges  for insiders. Given  the
uncertainties  surrounding  the calculation  of IDX,  we decided,  as discussed  earlier,  to use a second
measure  of labor  market distortion:  the proportion  of workers  in wage employment  (PWE).
Figure 2 shows  the mean  values  of the two measures  of labor  market distortions
for different  groups  of low- and middle-income  countries. As expected,  the two measures  are
negatively  correlated-a  high wage distortion,  measured  by IDX,  is associated  with a smaller
formal  sector  and thus a lower  PWE.  West and East Africa,  followed  by South Asia, have  the19
highest wage distortion and the smallest proportion of wage employment. Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, for obvious historical reasons, have the largest proportion of formal employment.
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We now consider the explanatory variables relating to economic structure.  We
assume that the three elasticities-n,  y, X-will  vary across countries depending on their levels of
development. Therefore, we proxy them by per capita GDP and the level of education-
measured below by the secondary school enrollment rate."5 The international price level is taken
to be the same for all countries and hence not included as a separate explanatory variable.
15 Except  for Africa,  the primary  school  enrollment  rates  show  very little variability  across  countries. That is why
we preferred  to use secondary  enrollment. We also ran our regressions  using  the primazy  enrollment  rate, as a test
of robustness, and our conclusions  did not change.20
Measures  of political  structure  were obtained  from  various sources. The tax to
GDP ratio was obtained  from  the IMF statistics. We use the rate of urbanization  as a measure  of
the relative  importance  of urban forrnal  labor. Ideally,  we would  also have liked  to get a separate
measure  for the weight  of the capitalists  in the population. But this is impossible  to obtain  for
most countries. Moreover,  the importance  and power  of the capitalists  is not necessarily  related
to their relative  numbers. We assumed  that the importance  of the capitalists  is an endogenous
variable  which  depends  upon the political  regime  and do not include  it in the reduced  form
equation.
We argue  that the weight  governments  give  to formal  workers and the capitalists
as well  as their expected  longevity  (S', SK  and 1r)  will  depend  upon the nature  of the regime. The
type of regime  was classified  using the indices  for political  rights  (PoL) and civil  liberties  (civ)
compiled  by the group Freedom  House. These indices  range from 1 to 7, with I indicating  the
most rights  and liberties  and 7 the least. As defined  by Freedom  House,  "political  rights  enable
people  to participate  freely  in the political  process",  and  "civil  liberties  are the freedoms  to
develop  views,  institutions  and personal  autonomy  apart from the state" (Ryan 1994,  p. 671).
In practice,  political  and civil  liberties  go hand in hand. Figure  3 presents  regional
averages  for the two Freedom  House indices,  and shows  the high  positive  correlation  between
them-for  the year 1990,  we calculated  the correlation  coefficient  between  the two indices  to be
0.92. In our regressions,  we used the two indices  interchangeably,  with very little  differences  in
results.  The figure  also indicates  that on average  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  and in the21
Middle  East and  North Africa  have  the lowest  levels  of political  and civil  liberties,  while  Eastern
Europe and Central  Asia  and Latin  America  have  the highest  levels  of liberties.
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Source:  Freedom  House
On the basis  of the preceding  discussion,  we estimate  three equations. Equation
(15) is derived  from (12), and considers  trade distortions. The next  two equations  examine  labor
market  distortions: (16) is derived  directly  from (14), and (17) is a variant  using the alternative
measure  of labor  market distortion,  PWE:
DOLLAR =  aO + a,  GDP per capita + a2 urbanization + a3 education + a4 tax rate +
aC POL + U 1 (15)22
IDX = Po  + PI  GDP per capita  +  32  urbanization  + P3  education  + N tax rate + P5  POL +
016 DOLLAR  +  U2  (16)
PWE  = 8  + 61 GDP  per capita  + 82  urbanization  +  83 education  +  84 tax rate + 85 POL  +
86  DOLLAR  + U3  (17)
The test of our two competing  hypotheses  of whether  democratic  or authoritarian
regimes  are more  prone to have  distortionary  labor  policies  consists  of testing  for the signs  of as,
15,  0,6,  8s and  66.  If democratic  regimes  that do not repress  labor  are more likely  to achieve
better labor market  outcomes,  this implies  that as and 15  should  be positive  and Bs  negative-i.e.,
regimes  with more  political  freedom  tend to have  fewer  restrictions  on trade, which  in turn implies
a smaller  spread  between  formal  and informal  workers  and a relatively  larger proportion  of the
labor  force in formal  employment.  Our analytical  model  also indicates  that under both hypotheses
the sign  of  16  and 66 should  be positive:  labor market  distortions  cannot  persist  if the product
markets  are competitive.
5. Empirical  results
Table  2 shows  the parameter  estimates  for equation  (15). We start by including
both the political  and civil  liberties  indices  as explanatory  variables. The political  liberties  index  is
positive  and slightly  significant,  indicating  that countries  with less  political  freedoms  tend to have
more  closed  trade regimes,  but the civil  liberties  index  is insignificant.  This result  is not
particularly  surprising,  since  the two indices  are so highly  correlated. When  we drop the civil
liberties  index,  the political  index  becomes  much  more significant  (second  row). The other
variable  that appears  to be highly  significant  is education,  with countries  that have a more23
educated labor force tending to be more open.  Surprisingly, GDP per capita, the tax to GDP ratio
and urbanization all appear to be unrelated to openness.  When experimented with dropping some
variables and with using the civil liberties index instead of the political index, the result did not
change. In general, countries with more political rights and civil liberties appear to have less trade
distortions.
Table 2 Regression results: dependent variable is dollar index  of openness
Const.  GDP/  Urbanization Education  Tax  Political  Civil  No. of  R 2
capita  rate  rights  liberties  obs.
107**  -0.0  0.3  50.2  9.1*  -5.6  71  0.24
(4.7)  (-0.6)  (1.0)  (0.76)  (1.8)  (-0.8)
98.2**  -0.0  0.3  -2.7**  63.4  5.4**  71  0.24
(5.0)  (-0.5)  (1.0)  (-2.3)  (1.0)  (2.16)
111**  -0.0  -2.4**  40.2  5.1**  82  0.18
(7.6)  (-0.1)  (-2.1)  (0.7)  (2.0)
97**  -0.0  44.1  7.1**  82  0.18
(8.2)  (-1.0)  (0.8)  (2.9)
100**  -0.0  7.6**  90  0.18
(8.2)  (-1.0)  (3.4)
101**  -0.0  8.0**  90  0.14
(6.8)  (-1.1)  (3.0)
Notes:
- An increase  in the dollar index implies  greater  restrictions  on trade
**  significant  at the 5% level
significant  at the 10%  level
- numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics
- the education  variable  is defined  as the secondary  school  enrollment  rate
The robustness of the above conclusion was tested by re-estimating all of the
equations presented in Table 2 using MNTB, TARIFF and BMP as dependent variables.  The results
for MNTB and BMP are quite similar to the ones obtained for the DOLLAR index, with the
coefficient on POL being positive and significant. However, the use of TARIFF as a measure of
openness changes our conclusion. The coefficient on POL in the TARIFF equation is insignificant
and has a negative sign. Table 3 illustrates those conclusions by presenting the estimates for the
most general  form of equation  (15) with  MNTB, TARIFF and  BMP as dependent  variables.24
Table 3 Sensitivity  to choice  of openness  measure
Depend.  Const.  GDP/  Urbanization Education  Tax  Political  No of  R 2
variable  capita  rate  rights  obs.
MNTs  26.7  -0.00  -0.04  0.31  46.4  8.0**  48  0.24
(1.2)  (-0.5)  -(0.13)  (0.22)  (0.6)  (2.7)
TARIFF  64.3  -0.00  -0.02  0.53  -94.4*  -2.6  48  0.19
(4.2)  (-1.1)  (-0.1)  (0.5)  (-1.8)  (-1.20
BMP  15.9  0.01  -0/05  9.2  - 47.7**  67  0.23
(0.14)  (0.4)  (-0.0)  (1.4)  1082**  (2.7)
(-2.8)
Notes:
**  significant  at the 5% level
*  significant  at the 10%  level
-numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics
-the  education  variable  is defined  as the secondary  school  enrollment  rate
Estimates of the parameters of equation (16) are presented in Table 4.  As
predicted by our model, there is a strong positive correlation between the DOLLAR index and the
index of wage distortion.  However, none of the other parameters is statistically significant. The
index of political liberties becomes significant  only when the DOLLAR index is dropped from the
equation-which  is not surprising, since we have already shown that they are highly correlated.
Our results now show that in addition to having more trade distortions, authoritarian countries
also tend to have more labor market distortions. However, those results, especially the fact that
the wage distortion appears to be only affected by openness and political liberties, may simply
reflect the weakness of our wage distortion index.
Table 5 shows the estimates for equation 17. They support our previous
conclusion concerning the link between openness and labor policy. The parameter on the DOLLAR
index is negative and significant,  indicating that more closed economies generally have relatively
smaller formal labor markets.  The parameter on political liberties is also negative, but significant
only in equations where the DOLLAR index is dropped, which is probably a reflection of the high25
correlation  between  these two variables. Urbanization  and the tax rate enter those regressions
with very significant  positive  coefficients,  indicating  that countries  with high  urbanization  and tax
to GDP ratios also have a relatively  larger  formal  labor market. This is the opposite  of what is
predicted  by the model,  and may  simply  reflect  the fact that urbanization  and tax revenue  are not
predetermined  with respect  to the size of the formal  sector. We tried to deal with this by using
instrumental  variables,  with lagged  values of the explanatory  variables  as instruments,  but the
results did  not change  (last  row of Table  5). Since  our concern  is with the impact  of political
liberties  and openness  on formal  employment-and not urbanization  and  tax policy-we  did not
pursue  this further  by looking  for better instruments.
Table 4 Regression results: dependent variable is index  of wage distortion
Const.  GDP/  Urbanization  Education  Tax  Political  DOLLAR  No.  of  R2
capita  rate  rights  index  obs.
0.6  .00  -0.02  -0.04  -2.3  0.1  0.02**  42  0.45
(0.6)  (0.6)  (-1.4)  (-0.8)  (-0.8)  (0.7)  (3.0)
0.9  0.00  -0.02  -0.04  -2.4  0.02**  42  0.44
(1.0)  (0.5)  (-1.6)  (-0.8)  (-0.9)  (3.5)
1.9**  0.00  -0.01  -0.1  0.4  0.21*  42  0.32
(2.0)  (0.2)  (-0.8)  (-1.5)  (0.14)  (1.8)
-0.4  -0.00  0.02**  48  0.26
(-0.4)  (-1.4)  (3.3)
0.65  -0.00  0.36**  50  0.21
(0.95)  (-0.6)  (2.7)
Notes:
- An increase  in the index implies  worse labor  market  policies
- education  is defined  as the secondary  school  enrollment  rate
**  significant  at the 5% level
*  significant  at the 10%  level
- numbers  in parentheses  are t- statistics
We also experimented  with dropping  some  variables. The results of regressions
where  we dropped  all explanatory  variables  except GDP per capita and the DOLLAR and political
liberties  indices  are presented  in Table  5. In both cases  GDP per capita  had a positive  and
significant  coefficient.  The openness  index  had a negative  coefficient,  with a t-statistic  that was26
just below the 10% critical value.  And the political liberties index had a negative and significant
coefficient. It appears that countries with less political freedoms have relatively smaller formal
labor markets, an indication of greater distortions.
Table  5 Regression  results:  dependent  variable  is proportion  of labor  force  in wage  employment
(results  in last row were obtained  using instrumental  variables)
Const.  GDP/  Urbanization  Education  Tax  Political  DOLLAR  No. of  R 2
capita  rate  liberties  index  Obs.
23.6**  -0.00  0.7**  0.3  65.8*  -0.2  -0.16**  50  0.63
(2.1)  (-0.3)  (4.1)  (0.5)  (1.8)  (-0.2)  (-2.5)
22.9**  -0.00  0.7**  0.3  64.9*  -0.16**  50  0.63
(2.2)  (-0.2)  (4.2)  (0.4)  (1.9)  (-2.6)
10.0  0.00  0.6**  0.9*  44.2  -0.9  53  0.61
(1.0)  (1.0)  (3.6)  (1.7)  (1.3)  (-0.7)
50.5**  0.01**  -0.12  60  0.35
(5.2)  (4.9)  (-1.6)
50.4**  0.00**  -2.7**  67  0.37
(7.8)  (5.12)  (-2.0)
16.4  -0.00  0.7**  0.01  101**  -0.13**  44  0.59
(1.5)  (-0.8)  (4.3)  (0.0)  (2.7)  (-2.0)
Notes:
- An increase  in the proportion  of wage employment  is taken  as an indication  of good  labor  policies
*  significant  at the 5% level
*  significant  at the 10%  level
- numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics
- the education  variable  is defined  as the secondary  school  enrollment  rate.
We tried re-doing the estimates in tables 4 and 5 using other measures of
openness.  The results were not as strong.  Estimates with MNTB  and BM  had the same sign as
estimates with the dollar index, but were rarely statistically  significant. This may be due to a
couple of reasons:  either the smaller number of observations for MNTB  and BMP, or the fact that
the relationship between MNTB and BMP and labor market distortions is not that strong.  Estimates
using TARIFF were also insignificant, but had the wrong sign-which  could have been expected
from the correlation coefficients presented in Table 1.  Thus, our general conclusion that
countries with less liberties tend to have more barriers to trade and more labor market distortions
is quite sensitive to the choice of openness measures.27
6.  Conclusions
Our work provides  some  support  to the view  that in general,  authoritarian  regimes
tend to be more subordinate  to special  interests  than regimes  with more political  and civil
liberties." 6 The empirical  conclusions  support  the analysis  underlying  this view-that  in many
authoritarian  settings,  urban  labor  and owners  of capital  tend to have  greater relative  power, since
the majority  of rural  and informal  workers  are not allowed  to vote and cannot  organize  urban
unrest and demonstrations  to bring  down  the government;  hence,  such authoritarian  governments
would  provide  powerful  urban groups  with special  protection  through  higher  tariffs  or quotas on
imports,  and ensure  that part of the rent goes to labor  by mandating  high  minimum  wages and
other labor  market interventions.  This  is the pattern  which  could  be observed  in many  countries
in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the Middle  East and Latin  America  in the 1970s  and 1980s. Authoritarian
governments  often repressed  labor and only  permitted  unions  subordinate  to the regime. They
then  tried to ensure support  for these state-sponsored  unions  by giving  them further  concessions
and protections. The result  may  have  been outcomes  that are inefficient.  17
Landell-Mills  and Serageldin  (1992)  present  the view that freedom  of association  is
one of the elements  of good governance,  necessary  for development.  Our work supports  that
view. Clearly,  this does not mean  that inequitable  or inefficient  labor policies  are the exclusive
domain  of authoritarian  governments,  or that authoritarianism  automatically  implies  bad policies.
As  we discussed  in the introduction,  there are numerous  individual  counter-examples  that prove
this statement  wrong.
16 The term subordinate  here is used in the sense  of Rodrik  (1992).
17 Pencavel  (1995)  describes  a policy  framework  which  maximizes  the benefits  from unionism  (higher  productivity
and greater  equity)  and minimizes  the costs  (monopolistic  wage  increases).28
This paper also  follows  up on the work by Fields  (1994)  and Freeman  (1993 on
East Asia,  where  they argue  that labor  repression  is neither  necessary,  nor desirable,  for
development.  Our results  are more general,  since  our attempt  is to study a large cross-section  of
developing  countries  rather than  to carry  out a detailed  study of a few  countries. On the other
hand,  data limitations  and measurement  problems  render  our conclusions  less  robust.
Our findings,  however,  are consistent  with some of the empirical  literature  on the
link  between  political  systems  and economic  growth. For example,  work by Barro (1991),  Ozler
and  Rodrik (1992)  and others  have  found that worse civil  liberties  are strongly  correlated  with
lower growth. In a similar  manner,  undesirable  labor  market  policies  act to handicap  the process
of economic  growth, by directly  stifling  the process  of production  and capital  accumulation.  Our
conclusion,  that authoritarianism  and labor  repression  appear  more likely  to be associated  with
less  desirable  labor  market outcomes,  points  to yet another  reason  why economies  characterized
by the lack  of political  freedoms  may  have  faced lower  rates of growth.29
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